This paper explores the corporate tax implications of compensating employees with nonqualified stock options. Corporations deduct the difference between current market and strike prices when an employee exercises a nonqualified stock option. For option-intensive companies with rising stock prices, this deduction can be very large. The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of these deductions on marginal tax rates and corporate decisions, such as debt policy. 1 Understanding the tax implications of options is increasingly important because the proportion of compensation paid in stock options has soared in recent years. Desai (2002) The exercise of these stock options has created large corporate income tax deductions. Sullivan (2002) estimates that the total corporate tax savings from the deduction of stock options jumped from $12 billion in 1997 to $56 billion in 2000. Ciprianao, Collins and Hribar (2001) report that the tax savings from employee stock option deductions for the S&P 100 and the Nasdaq 100 averaged 32 percent of operating cash flows in 2000, up from 8 percent in 1997. Sullivan (2002) adds that option tax deductions in 2000 exceeded net income for eight of the 40 largest U.S. companies (as determined by market capitalization): Microsoft, American Online, Cisco Systems, Amgen, Dell Computer, Sun Microsystems, Qualcomm, and Lucent.
Furthermore, companies as diverse as General Electric, Pfizer, Citigroup, and IBM deducted over $1 billion in stock option compensation in 2000.
We confirm that employee stock option deductions substantially reduce corporate tax payments. We estimate that in 2000 stock options reduced corporate taxable income by approximately $100 billion for our sample of S&P 100 and Nasdaq 100 firms. For the S&P 100 firms, aggregate stock option deductions equal approximately 10 percent of aggregate pretax income. For the Nasdaq 100 companies (which are more option-intensive), aggregate deductions exceed aggregate pretax income. Not surprisingly, with corporate tax savings of these magnitudes, employee stock option deductions are attracting considerable political scrutiny, including current legislation to limit the tax deductions to the amount expensed for book purposes (e.g., Senate bill 1940, Ending the Double Standard for Stock Options Act, introduced February 13, 2002) . 2 This study, however, focuses primarily on the effect of employee stock options on marginal tax rates (MTRs) because MTRs often affect economic decision making. For our sample, the median marginal tax rate falls from 34 percent when we ignore option deductions, to 26 percent when we include options in the analysis. For Nasdaq firms, the deductions comprise such a large proportion of pre-option income that the median MTR tumbles from 31 percent to 5 percent when option deductions are included in the tax rate calculation. We isolate the effect of three classes of options on the MTR : those already exercised, those granted but not yet 2 Enron's recent failure has contributed to the growing attention on the magnitude of stock option deductions. For example, the New York Times (February 7, 2002) states, "Enron's collapse has also renewed lawmakers' interest in how companies that issue stock options do not have to deduct their costs under accounting rules. But these companies can and do take sizable tax deductions every year in which large blocks of options are exercised by executives. As a result, many of the nation's largest and most profitable companies have escaped paying income taxes in recent years. From 1996 to 2000, for example, Enron eliminated taxes of $625 million through aggressive stock option grants." exercised, and those yet to be granted. Each class of options contributes to the overall reduction in MTRs.
Such large reductions in marginal tax rates can have important implications for corporate decisions that hinge on MTRs, such as debt policy. Previous research has investigated whether taxes affect financing decisions, often with mixed results (see Graham (2002) for a review).
Some conclude that high-MTR firms appear to carry insufficient debt in their capital structure (Graham (2000) ). Hanlon and Shevlin (2002) , however, point out that these previous studies ignore tax deductions from stock option exercise. Employee stock options can influence debt policy when they are large enough to affect marginal tax rates. For example, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that companies substitute between debt and nondebt tax shields (such as option deductions) when determining their optimal capital structure.
In our sample, debt ratios and MTRs are not pairwise correlated when we ignore option deductions in the construction of marginal tax rates. In contrast, after adjusting for expected option deductions, the relation between debt and taxes is positive and significant. This result indicates that accounting for the tax deductions associated with stock options provides important incremental power to explain debt policy, which is consistent with managers factoring in the tax effects of options when they select capital structure. Furthermore, when we identify firms that appear to be underlevered when option deductions are ignored, we find that these firms are the ones that use the most options. Overall, our analysis is consistent with firms trading off debt and nondebt tax shields when making capital structure decisions in the manner suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) . Our results also provide a partial answer to the puzzle of why some firms currently appear to be underlevered (Graham (2000) )-they are less underlevered once option deductions are considered.
Three important conceptual issues should be addressed by any study that investigates the interaction between stock option deductions and corporate MTRs. First, current-period MTRs can be affected by already-exercised options (because they affect the level of taxable income and possibly tax loss carryforwards), the overhang of already-granted, but not-yet-exercised, options (because these options can create losses in the future that affect current-period MTRs via the carryforward and carryback features of the tax code), and not-yet-granted options. All studies of which we are aware only consider one of these types of options: already-exercised options. This limitation is acceptable for research examining effective tax burdens such as Desai (2002) , Hanlon and Sullivan (2002) . However, it is important to consider all three classes of options when studying economic decisions based on marginal tax incentives.
A second important issue is related to using financial statement data to infer tax implications for stock options. While firms are required to disclose the tax benefits attributable to employee stock options in the financial statements, Hanlon and Shevlin (2002) stress that using the reported "tax benefits from stock options" numbers is problematic. One difficulty arises because firms that avoid recognizing stock option expense on the income statement are also prohibited from allowing stock option deductions to reduce income tax expense in financial statements. The underlying logic is that, since the original charge did not reduce pretax income, the tax benefit at exercise should not decrease tax expense. As a result, a firm can consistently report high tax expense (on financial statements) and never pay any taxes (on tax returns) because the difference never reverses. Moreover, Hanlon and Shevlin report that only 63 of the Nasdaq 100 report "tax benefits from options" on their income statement in 1999. Even when it is reported, another difficulty arises in that the tax benefit number is not consistently reported across firms; reporting differences are most acute when comparing profitable to unprofitable firms. We avoid these issues by following Hanlon and Shevlin's advice and using the detailed information on grants and exercises found in the financial footnotes. This information is reported consistently across firms.
The final conceptual issue is related to the uncertainty of if and when not-yet-exercised options will lead to corporate tax deductions. Corporations have little control over employee exercise behavior and therefore over the amount of option deductions in any given year. This year's nonqualified grants produce no deductions until the options are exercised in the future, while this year's exercises relate to grants from several years ago. Moreover, because share prices are volatile and options have long lives (most often ten years), today's grants can generate huge deductions in the future or no deductions at all, depending on the stock price path.
In general, the stochastic nature of stock option deductions can substantially complicate computations of estimated marginal tax rates and consequently any corporate decisions in which taxes are relevant. The stock price path and employee exercise decisions are difficult to predict and are largely outside of the control of the corporation. For efficient tax and financial planning, a manager would need to factor in the probabilities and amounts of future option deductions. In this spirit, we explicitly implement a simulation approach for considering stock option deductions (described in detail in Section I). Specifically, using information on stock options, stock return volatility, dividends, and expected returns, we modify the Graham (1996) simulation technology. We combine expected deductions with simulated taxable income to arrive at probability-weighted estimates of future taxable income and MTRs. The analysis is very similar to the approach we envision a corporate manager would undertake to make decisions based on expected marginal tax rates. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to take the ex ante perspective of explicitly incorporating pre-exercise option information into marginal tax rate estimates.
In sum, the first half of our paper investigates in detail whether and how option deductions affect corporate marginal tax rates. The second half analyzes whether option deductions affect corporate debt policy decisions, and more generally, the issue of why some firms appear underlevered. The paper most similar to the second half of our paper is Kahle and Shastri (2002) , who investigate whether firms with large option deductions use less debt.
However, Kahle and Shastri do not consider several issues that we address. First, they do not calculate marginal tax rates, or the effect of options on marginal tax rates. These omissions are a shortcoming because option deductions should only affect capital structure decisions to the extent that they affect MTRs. Second, they measure option deductions with the "tax benefits" number, even though Hanlon and Shevlin (2002) report numerous problems with this approach.
Third, Kahle and Shastri do not consider two classes of options that we consider: already granted but not-yet-exercised and not-yet-granted. Finally, Kahle and Shastri address neither the uncertainty of option exercise timing, nor more generally how option deductions interact with the dynamic aspects of the federal income tax code.
Besides effective tax rate and capital structure research, this paper is related to two other branches of research. First, a series of papers investigates whether tax incentives play a role in the form of compensation a firm chooses to use. The early research in this area was inconclusive (e.g., Hall and Liebman (2000) ); however, recent research by Core and Guay (2001) finds that high tax rate firms issue fewer stock options to non-executive employees, presumably because the firms would rather use traditional forms of compensation that lead to an immediate compensation deduction. Our paper does not investigate whether taxes affect the choice between various forms of compensation, but does indicate that firms consider the tax effects of compensation when deciding on corporate capital structure. Second, our paper is related to the literature that investigates how tax managers optimize corporate tax policy (e.g., Scholes et al (2001) ). We contribute to this body of literature by providing evidence consistent with tax managers considering the interaction of various corporate policies when choosing tax positions.
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In the next section, we discuss our empirical approach in detail and describe the data.
Section II analyzes the effect of option deductions on corporate marginal tax rates. Section III examines the interaction between option deductions and corporate debt policy. Section IV presents closing remarks and points out that, as large as corporate deductions are, the net effect of stock option compensation likely is a revenue gain for the U.S. Treasury because of the income taxes that employees pay at exercise.
I. Empirical Approach

A. Sample
We study the firms that were in the Standard and Poor's 100 and the Nasdaq 100 on July 17, 2001 (the day we began data collection). They comprise a substantial proportion of the economy and pay substantial taxes. 4 Analysis of S&P 100 firms provides insight about traditional, stable industrial firms. The Nasdaq 100 firms are the most profitable and stable among option-intensive, high technology firms. Seven firms are in both the Nasdaq and S&P, so the initial sample includes 193 firms. We are unable to locate data for three firms, which reduces the sample to 190 companies. 5 We limit the sample to these firms because (i) hand-collecting stock option data in the financial statement footnotes is costly, and (ii) our simulation method (described below) is less likely to produce reliable results for small, unstable firms.
We envision a scenario in which a manager assesses his firm's marginal tax rate at the end of the fiscal year. Our reference point is the most recent year for which data were available at the inception of this project, which is fiscal year- as much taxable income as they did, this situation is the one they faced at year-end 2000. In addition, the bull market of the 1990s means that the exercise of stock options for years to come has the potential to trigger large tax deductions, even if stock returns are flat for the next several years. 7 Regardless, the approach that we develop in this study should be useful in any year for incorporating stock option deductions in marginal tax rate calculations. 
B. Overview of Simulation Procedure
The simulation procedure that we use to estimate 2000 marginal tax rates incorporates dynamic features of the tax code including tax loss carrybacks and carryforwards (Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996) These examples demonstrate that to estimate the current-period MTR, we need to forecast future taxable income (discussed in Section C), future grant and exercise behavior (Section D), and future stock prices (Section E).
C. Estimating Historic and Future Income (Ignoring Option Deductions)
In this section we discuss the task of measuring income ignoring option deductions. In the next section we discuss how we subtract historic and expected future option deductions to derive taxable income.
We implement a variation of the algorithm used in Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996) 
D. Including Historic and Future Options Exercises
Since 1996 Leibman (2000) find that 95 percent of all stock options are nonqualified, so we make the simplifying assumption that all options reported in the footnote are nonqualified.
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The footnote contains historic exercise information for the preceding two and current fiscal years (1998, 1999, and 2000 for most of our firms). For each firm, we calculate option deductions as the number of options exercised in a given year times the difference between the average strike price for those options and the share price at exercise. We measure the share price at exercise for a given year using the average stock price for options granted in that same year.
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Incorporating historic option deductions into our analysis is straightforward: we subtract the historic employee option deductions from the income figures derived in the previous section.
Note that historic option deductions can affect the MTR in 2000 by reducing taxable income in 2000 and also by creating a tax loss in 1998 or 1999 that is carried forward into 2000. We experimented with also gathering historic options data for 1995, 1996, and 1997 for a random sample of eight firms but the cost of hand-gathering the data was large and the benefit small (these extra data barely affected our results). 14 in the respective plan. Twenty-eight companies disclose a range for Black-Scholes assumptions, and five disclose a range of exercise prices rather a weighted average, perhaps reflecting the fact that they use different assumptions for different groups of employees. In these cases, we use the midpoint of the range because sufficient detail is not available to calculate a weighted average. Finally, eight firms disclose dividends per share rather than dividend yield. In these cases, we compute dividend yield based on year-end share price. In total, 73 firms report in one of these nonstandard formats. If we exclude these 73 firms, the mean tax rate increases by approximately 90 basis points, but the overall implications of our study do not change. 12 There is a rare situation where incentive stock options can provide a tax deduction. If an employee undertakes a "disqualifying disposition," the tax treatment for an incentive stock option is identical to a nonqualified stock option. Matsunaga, Shevlin, and Shores (1992) discuss the unusual conditions following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that led some firms to provide incentives for employees to disqualify. 13 For example, using the Microsoft footnote disclosure in the appendix for the year ended June 30, 2000, the estimated 2000 tax deduction for stock options is $13,925,340,000, which is the product of the 198 million options exercised and the difference in the weighted average grant price of $79.87 and the weighted average strike price of $9.54. 14 In our approach, we first forecast taxable income based on historic data (ignoring options, as described in Section C) and then subtract the effects of options in a second step (as described in Section D). An alternative approach would be to subtract the effect of options from all historic data (up to 20 years of data) and then forecast post-
The footnote also contains information on options already granted, but not yet exercised.
To incorporate these future deductions into our analysis, we make assumptions about option exercise behavior. Huddart and Lang (1996) and Core and Guay (2000) report that early exercise of employee stock options is common, with much of the exercise occurring about halfway through the option's life, and that exercise tends to be spread smoothly over time. Thus, we use the disclosed expected option life as our estimate of when average exercise will occur and assume exercise is spread smoothly over a period beginning two years before that year and ending two years after that year.
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Some stock price paths imply that option exercise is not optimal because the market price is close to or below strike price (our derivation of future stock price paths is described in the next section). Therefore, we follow the convention in Huddart and Lang (1996) and assume no exercise in years in which options are in-the-money by 15 percent or less (unless the option is at expiration, in which case we assume all in-the-money options are exercised). In cases in which options are out-of-the-money or barely in-the-money, we defer exercise until the first year in which they are in-the-money by at least 15 percent (or until expiration).
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options income into the future. Unfortunately, because the stock option disclosures have only been required since 1996, we cannot adjust the estimates of taxable income in all prior years, so this alternative approach is infeasible. 15 We do not explicitly incorporate vesting schedules because the stock option footnotes are often vague and indicate a range of vesting periods. Further, our use of expected lives should incorporate the effects of vesting. To get a sense for the typical vesting schedule, we gathered the available information from the option footnotes. The average vesting period (using the midpoint when a range is indicated) is 3.5 years for our sample firms, and most firms indicate that vesting occurs ratably over time, typically beginning within the first year. As a result, our assumption that option exercise is spread over the period beginning two years prior to and ending two years following the expected life (4.8 years on average) seems consistent with the likely vesting schedules. Huddart and Lang (1996) suggest that exercise is common immediately following vesting dates. On another note, it is possible that in 2000 the expected option life that companies report in the footnotes is low by historic standards, due to the bull market of the 1990s, which may have encouraged early exercise and shorter option lives. To investigate how a longer expected life would affect our results, we perform a robustness check in which we add two years to the expected life of all options. The mean estimated tax rate in this analysis is only 10 basis points higher than what we report below, and overall qualitative results are unchanged. 16 For example, the Microsoft footnote disclosure in the appendix reports a weighted average expected life of 6. for currently nontaxed firms, by creating large tax losses that will be carried forward. We assume that firms grant future options in an amount equal to the average number granted (net of cancellations) during the past three years, times a growth factor. 17 The growth factor is based on a given firm's pre-option income growth (bounded between the 25 th and 75 th percentiles for income growth rates of other firms in the same 2-digit SIC code). 18 The strike price for a given firm-year's newly granted options is assumed to be the stock price for that firm-year. In the next section we describe how the stock price is determined. 18 In unreported analysis, we perform our calculations based on sales revenue growth, rather than income growth. Sales growth rates are typically much larger than income growth rates in our sample, so we use the latter so that our future options grant numbers are conservative. 19 In addition, if firms increasingly substitute options for compensation that is currently expensed (e.g., salary), then our estimates of future pre-option income will be understated. This understatement will occur if in the future firms were to rely more heavily on non-expensed options. The simulation, however, uses past accounting earnings (with Finally, throughout the study we ignore repricing, i.e., reducing the strike price of already granted options. To the extent firms are committed to a policy of repricing during downward price movements, this assumption understates future option deductions.
E. Estimating Future Stock Prices
We forecast future stock prices so that we can project the magnitude of future stock option deductions. We project a separate future stock price path for each of the 50 simulations of the future described in Section A. This procedure allows the value of stock options to vary with stock prices (and because we link stock prices to earnings, to vary with different earnings simulations).
To project future stock prices, we compute an expected return for each firm, based on the CAPM market model. This total return calculation requires a firm-specific beta (taken from CRSP), the risk-free rate (from each-firm's stock option footnote), and an equity risk premium of 3.0 percent (which is consistent with recent estimates of the risk premium in Fama and French (2001) ). 20 We are interested in capital appreciation in stock price, so we subtract the firmspecific dividend-yield from each firm's total return.
Stock prices tend to vary with earnings. Easton and Harris (1991) show that changes in annual earnings and annual returns are positively related (Pearson correlation of approximately 20 percent). Therefore, to incorporate this positive empirical association between stock returns and earnings, we modify expected returns to link them to the earnings projections derived in Section C. We assume that unexpectedly high earnings are accompanied by proportionally its heavier reliance on expensed compensation) to forecast future pre-option earnings. The effect on taxable income of this underestimate of future accounting earnings will be balanced by the underestimate of future employee stock option deductions.
positive expected stock returns. For example, consider a case in which earnings were expected to grow at 10 percent and stock price was expected to grow at 12 percent. Suppose in a given simulation we end up on a path with earnings growing 15 percent in the first year (50 percent higher growth rate than expected). To link the two series, we assign a mean stock price growth on that path of 18 percent for that year (50 percent higher than expected). This adjustment modifies the expected stock return in a way that implies a link between earnings and returns.
Robustness checks, however, indicate that the degree of assumed correlation is not particularly important. When we replicate the study assuming independence between annual earnings and annual returns, inferences are qualitatively unaltered (mean tax rates are 60 basis points lower than those reported in the base case below). Moreover, our qualitative results do not change if we assume that stock prices increase 12 percent annually for all firms.
Given an expected stock return, we project future stock prices by drawing returns from a lognormal distribution. For each year, the mean of this distribution equals the expected return, calculated as just described, and the variance is that reported in the stock option footnotes.
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In our approach, we use historic data to estimate income growth (as described in Section C) and a modified CAPM expected return (as described in this section). In a robustness check, we use Value Line projections for the 131 firms in our sample for which Value Line provides estimates. For income growth, we annualize the Value Line "four year growth rate" estimate of sales growth when it is available, or use the Value Line earnings growth rate when sales growth is not available. For stock returns, we annualize the return implicit in the average of the high and low "four year ahead target stock prices." Using these alternative earnings and stock growth rates yields mean MTRs that are only 30 basis points higher than those we report below and no difference in the overall qualitative results.
II. Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Option Deductions on Corporate MTRs
A. Descriptive Statistics
Table I presents descriptive statistics for the stock option disclosures of the S&P 100 and the Nasdaq 100 samples. For both groups, the average expected option life is close to five years, although it is slightly shorter for Nasdaq firms. This expectancy is consistent with the higher volatility for Nasdaq firms, possibly coupled with risk aversion precipitating early exercise. Not surprisingly, given GAAP reporting requirements, the risk-free rate is very similar for the two samples, equaling approximately 6 percent. The small difference in the risk-free rate for the two samples probably reflects differences in year-ends (because risk-free rates should be similar for firms with common year-ends), with non-calendar year-ends more common for Nasdaq firms.
Dividend yield averages 1.5 percent for S&P 100 firms with most firms paying dividends. Conversely, few Nasdaq 100 firms pay dividends. The mean dividend yield is 0.1 percent and the 75 th percentile is zero. Annual stock return volatility is higher for Nasdaq 100 firms, with a mean volatility of 73 percent versus 36 percent for the S&P firms. The volatility of returns is important because it affects the probability that stock price appreciates greatly, which would lead to large option deductions in good scenarios. Table II summarizes firm characteristics. Not surprisingly, the market capitalization of the typical S&P 100 firm is roughly three times larger than that for Nasdaq 100 firms. However, there is substantial overlap between the two distributions, with the 75 th percentile of Nasdaq firms being much larger than the 25 th percentile of S&P firms. The difference in size between the two subsamples is more pronounced for total assets, reflecting the fact that Nasdaq valuation is based more prominently on intangibles and growth options.
In terms of profitability, the median return on assets (ROA) is quite similar for the two samples, and is actually a little higher for the Nasdaq firms (5.3 percent) than for the S&P firms (4.7 percent). The 75 th percentiles are about 11 percent for both subsamples. However, the dispersion of profitability is higher for Nasdaq firms, with a much higher proportion reporting losses. In fact, the 25 th percentile ROA is -2.5 percent for the Nasdaq firms versus 1.5 percent for the S&P firms. Nasdaq firms tend to use less debt in their capital structure, with a mean Similarly, before options 65 percent of the sample firms face marginal tax rates above 30 percent as compared with 46 percent after factoring in options.
In the next two sections, we analyze the effects of options separately for S&P and Nasdaq firms, and break out the effects by historic versus future exercise activity. Note that seven firms are in both the Nasdaq 100 and the S&P 100. For the remainder of the paper we classify these firms as S&P firms, leaving us with 99 firms in the S&P sample and 91 in the Nasdaq sample.
rate is only 15 basis points different from that reported below in the base case. years to 2020).
B. Tax Effects for S&P 100 Companies
The next three rows of Table III For the S&P 100 sample, we find that incorporating stock options into the simulations has relatively little effect on the marginal tax rates. In the fourth row of 
C. Tax Effects for Nasdaq 100 Companies
Options dramatically affect the marginal tax rates of Nasdaq 100 companies. The median marginal tax rate before options is 31 percent and the mean is 20 percent (see the bottom panel in Table III In 2000, the median Nasdaq 100 firm enjoyed option-related tax deductions of $173 million, with a mean of $388 million. Aggregating across the 91 firms, the resulting deductions total about $35 billion. This figure is striking because it is larger than the $13 billion of aggregate earnings before taxes and option deductions for the Nasdaq sample in 2000. Note that this deductions figure does not eliminate all taxes for the Nasdaq 100 because some firms have preoption income that exceeds option deductions and others have deductions that expire unused; however, it does indicate the enormous magnitude of the option deductions. 
III. Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Option Deductions on Debt Policy
The preceding section indicates that the effects of stock options on marginal tax rates can be substantial, especially among option-intensive companies. These substantial effects imply that option deductions might affect corporate policies for which the MTR is an important decision variable. In this section we explore whether the effect of option deductions on MTRs is important to corporate debt policy decisions. This investigation has the potential to help explain why some firms appear to use too little debt (when the effects of option deductions are ignored). rates and various measures of debt in the capital structure, specifically, debt-to-market value, debt-to-assets, and interest-to-market value. We examine pre-interest MTRs because Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) show that corporate tax status is endogenously affected by debt policy. That is, when a firm uses debt, the associated interest deduction reduces taxable income and can also reduce the MTR, which induces a spurious negative correlation between debt ratios and tax rates. This endogeneity can be avoided by using pre-interest MTRs (that is, tax rates based on earnings before interest and tax) when examining the relation between debt ratios and tax rates.
A. Univariate Analysis of Debt Policy
The first row (column) in Table IV on interest/value, which has the wrong sign). These correlations provide no evidence that capital structure is correlated with marginal tax rates for our sample (when we ignore options deductions).
The second row and column show the relation when the computation of pre-interest marginal tax rates is modified to include all employee stock option deductions (MTR w/ future grants). The relation is positive for all three debt variables. For the Spearman correlations, the correlations range from 0.25 to 0.34 and are always significant at the 0.01 level. These results are consistent with managers making financing and compensation decisions jointly, considering the effect of options on marginal tax rates.
22 22 This interpretation is consistent with our conversations with tax managers at several high-technology companies. Although these firms appear profitable based on their income statements, the managers indicate that debt is not particularly attractive because the company pays little in taxes. Similarly, this result may explain why Microsoft and Dell's derivatives trading is not as tax-inefficient as implied by the effective tax rates reported in their financial statements (McDonald (2002) ).
The third row and column present the correlations between the change in pre-interest marginal tax rates resulting from options (∆MTR w/ future grants) and the other variables. Two points are worth noting. First, the correlation between the decrease in rates and the post-option marginal tax rates is strongly positive, indicating that options have a significant effect on marginal tax rates. Second, the decrease in rates is positively correlated with the amount of debt in the capital structure. This correlation implies that firms that use options intensively enough to reduce their MTR use relatively little debt, which is consistent with firms trading off options and interest deductions.
B. Regression Analysis
To further assess the relation between option deductions, marginal tax rates and debt, Table V presents tobit regressions with debt-to-value as the dependent variable. We use the tobit method because the debt ratio equals zero (i.e., is left-censored) for 17 firms in our sample. Since determining a debt ratio for a financial institution is problematic, we delete the 34 firms that have a primary or secondary division that is financial (2-digit SIC code between 60 and 69). For deletion, we require that the financial division contribute at least 10% to total firm revenue. This process leaves 156 firms (down from the 190 included in Section II).
The first two columns of Table V are univariate and regress debt-to-value on MTR w/o options and MTR w/ future grants, respectively. Like the correlation coefficients presented in Table IV , the coefficient on the marginal tax rate variable, when all stock options are ignored, is insignificant. The coefficient on the marginal tax rate variable, when stock options are considered, is significantly and positively correlated with the debt ratio at the 0.01 level.
A number of nontax factors can affect debt policy, so it is important for us to control for these potential influences in a multivariate analysis. Controlling for such influences helps us isolate tax effects and minimize the possibility that our tax variable proxies for some other factor.
For example, financially weak firms face lower tax rates and also might face barriers to borrowing and use options to save cash. It seems unlikely that this condition drives the correlation between debt and tax rates because, if the issue is simply that less profitable firms are less able to obtain debt financing, the relation between marginal tax rates before options and debt should be significant, but it is not. However, to ensure that differences in financial health do not drive our results, we include controls for financial strength in the regression: operating cash flow divided by assets and the quick ratio.
We also control for three other factors that are commonly thought to drive debt policy (see Rajan and Zingales (1995) ): growth options, asset tangibility, and firm size. Firms with extensive growth options might use less debt to avoid the underinvestment problem (Myers (1977) ). Shareholders of a firm with risky fixed claims in its capital structure will potentially underinvest by forgoing positive NPV investments because project benefits might accrue to the firm's existing bondholders; this problem is likely to be more severe among growth firms.
Therefore, we expect firms with growth options, which we measure with research and development expense divided by sales, to use less debt. In contrast, firms with more tangible assets, as measured by property, plant and equipment divided by total assets, are less subject to underinvestment and informational asymmetry problems, and also have more assets to collateralize, and therefore can use more debt. Finally, larger firms are thought to have better access to debt markets, which allows them to borrow more. We therefore expect a positive relation between debt ratios and firms size, which we measure with sales revenue.
Note that data are missing for at least one of these explanatory variables for nine observations, so the regressions that include control variables have 147 observations. Finally, though not shown in the tables, every regression specification includes five dummy variables based on 2-digit SIC codes. We choose these five industries by performing a regression that includes a dummy for each 2-digit SIC code, and then retaining the five that are significant: SIC codes 26 (paper and allied products), 40 (railroads), 48 (communications), 49 (utilities), and 78
(amusements).
The third through sixth columns of (Myers and Majluf (1984) ), firms with more cash flow use less debt. Finally, large firms use more debt than do small firms.
More importantly for this study, in the third column, the control variables increase the significance of the pre-option tax rate, although it remains o nly marginally significant at conventional levels (p-value of 0.07). In the fourth column, the coefficient on the tax rate that includes the effects of historic option deductions (MTR w/ exercised options) is larger and more significant than the no-options tax rate (p-value of 0.03). In the fifth and sixth columns, coefficients on the tax rates that consider the effects of currently granted options (fifth column) and also future option grants (sixth column) are both significant at the 0.01 level. 23 The 23 The adjusted-R 2 is 60 percent in an OLS version of the regression in the sixth column.
increasing significance of the tax variables highlights the influence of stock option deductions on MTRs and debt policy.
The rightmost column of Table V presents a specification that includes the control variables, the tax rate variable that ignores options, and the difference between the no-options tax rate and the MTR w/ future grants. By using two tax variables, we are able to examine separately the effects on debt policy of traditional tax effects, as well the incremental effect of options. In this specification, the MTR w/o options tax variable is significant at the 0.01 level, and the incremental effect of options is significant at the 0.05 level, and both coefficients have the expected sign. Thus, we conclude that taxes affect capital structure decisions for reasons unrelated to, as well as directly related to, deductions that result from employee stock options.
C. Robustness Checks
We perform a number of robustness checks that consist of adding additional control variables or estimating the regressions on subsets of the data (see Table VI ). First, we examine the tax variable based on Value Line growth estimates, rather than using historical data to estimate income growth and the CAPM to estimate stock returns. The leftmost column of Table   VI indicates that the Value Line tax variable coefficient is 0.21 (and significant at the 0.01 level), which is nearly identical to the base case results in Table V .
Second, we include an S&P dummy variable (second column of Table VI) . Suppose the results are explained by differences between Nasdaq and S&P firms. Nasdaq firms may have low debt because of a nontax effect (e.g., perhaps because they have substantial growth options) and a low tax rate (possibly because growth firms often are currently or have recently been unprofitable). S&P firms may have high debt ratios and high tax rates. If so, then including an S&P dummy should cause the tax variable to be insignificant. In fact, the tax variable is less significant when the S&P dummy is included -but it is still significant (p-value of 0.05).
The third column summarizes the results of including stock volatility as a right-side variable. Firms with volatile returns might be considered risky and therefore have higher costs of debt and borrow less. The sign of the volatility coefficient is negative and consistent with this hypothesis but it is not significant. Importantly, the tax variable is still significant even when the stock volatility variable is included as a control.
The fourth column shows the results when a control variable measuring the dollar value of deductions, scaled by assets, is included. The purpose of this control is to rule out the possibility that the debt ratio is reacting solely to the size of the options. The positive coefficient on the tax variable (p-value of 0.07) provides some assurance that the effect of the options on the marginal tax rates has incremental value beyond merely identifying option-intensive firms.
The fifth through ninth columns of Table VI show the results from performing the main regression specification on different subsets of data. The intent of these five specifications is to investigate whether the significant tax results might be driven primarily by the contrasting behavior of two types of firms (unprofitable/low-tax/low-debt versus profitable/high-tax/highdebt), or whether the tax effects also occur for subsets of somewhat homogeneous firms for which theory predicts there should be tax effects.
The fifth column investigates the 130 firms that clearly have access to debt markets.
These firms all have at least some debt, and we test whether option-affected tax rates provide a positive incentive to use debt for these firms. The tax coefficient in the fifth column (from an OLS regression) indicates that high tax rate firms do indeed use more debt than low tax rate firms.
In the sixth column, we examine tax effects for the 120 firms that were profitable in 2000, to make sure that our overall results are not driven strictly by profitable/high-tax firms using more debt than loss/low-tax firms, perhaps for nontax reasons (like accessibility to debt markets). The next two columns explore the accessibility of debt markets further by considering firms that have an S&P bond rating (100 firms in column seven) or have an investment grade bond rating (72 firms in column eight). For all three subsets of these firms we find a positive and significant tax variable. Finally, in the rightmost column we examine the 101 firms that have taxable income growth of at least 3.6% (the sample mean). Again, the tax variable is positive and significant.
Overall, the results in Tables V and VI indicate that taxes exert a positive effect on the use of debt and that options use exerts a negative effect. These results are robust to a number of different specifications and sub-samples.
D. The Relation Between Stock Option Deductions and Debt Conservatism
The preceding sections link stock options and debt policy by documenting improved statistical power in detecting tax effects when MTRs incorporate option deductions. In this section we examine a direct measure of debt conservatism and test whether firms that appear to have the most debt capacity (when option deductions are ignored) use option deductions to reduce tax liabilities.
Graham (2000) develops a measure of debt conservatism that he refers to as "kink."
Without going into details, kink measures the proportion by which a firm could increase interest deductions without experiencing reduced marginal tax benefits for interest deductions. For example, consider a firm with EBIT of $2 million or more in every state of nature. If this firm has interest expense of $0.5 million, it has a kink of 4.0 because it could quadruple interest deductions and still enjoy the full tax-reducing benefit of interest deductions in every state. (That is, even if it quadruples interest, the firm will not experience a tax loss in any state, so all tax benefits are enjoyed in the current year). Graham notes that many large profitable firms, which presumably face small costs of debt financing, have large kinks and thus appear to be underlevered. Graham's analysis, however, does not incorporate option deductions.
We calculate kink for our sample firms based on pre-option income (for computational reasons, we restrict the maximum kink to 8.0, as in Graham (2000)). The median (mean) kink is 8.0 (5.33) for our sample, which appears to indicate debt conservatism. However, we uncover evidence consistent with conservative firms (i.e., those with large kinks) substituting option deductions in place of interest. The Pearson correlation in Table IV between kink and reduction in MTR is -0.24 (significant at 0.01 level), indicating that option deductions have the largest effect on marginal tax rates for firms that appear to have the most unused debt capacity (when option deductions are ignored). Similarly, the Pearson correlation between option deductions/value and interest/value is -0.54, which is consistent with firms substituting between option deductions and interest. Finally, when we recalculate kink based on EBT that subtracts options deductions, the mean kink falls to 4.25 from 5.33 (though the median kink remains at 8.0). The fact that the mean kink falls by one-fifth indicates the importance of the economic effect of stock option deductions on capital structure.
Overall, this evidence is consistent with firms that appear debt conservative (when options are ignored) using option deductions heavily in place of interest. However, the large mean kink of 4.33 indicates that employee stock option deductions offer only a partial explanation of why some firms appear underlevered. Additional research is needed to more fully understand the underleverage issue.
IV. Conclusions
The tax deduction for nonqualified employee stock options is unusual. The company has little control over its timing or amount. Instead, the corporate deduction is delayed until employees choose to exercise. The amount of the deduction is determined by the firm's stock price years after the options are granted. This paper develops an approach for evaluating the complex, uncertain tax benefits associated with employee stock options, impounding the corporate tax savings in marginal tax rates, and assessing the effects of the option deduction on an important corporate decision, debt policy.
Incorporating option information from financial statement disclosures into Graham's (1996) marginal tax rate simulations, we compute marginal tax rates that take account of option deductions. We then compare these firm-specific rates with companies' debt levels in an attempt to assess the relation between tax shields associated with leverage and tax shields associated with option compensation.
We find that employee stock options substantially reduce corporate taxes for both the industrial S&P 100 and the high-technology Nasdaq 100. For the more option-intensive Nasdaq 100, stock options dramatically reduce estimated marginal tax rates with the median rate tumbling from 31 percent to 5 percent. Consistent with the concerns raised in Hanlon and Shevlin (2002) , our findings raise doubts about the usefulness of conventional marginal tax rates, which ignore stock option deductions. Unfortunately, developing marginal tax rates that impound option deductions from public sources is costly because the option data must be hand-collected from financial statements. Because scholars, policymakers, practitioners, and analysts, among others, need marginal tax rates for option-intensive companies, future research should consider developing a low-cost method of estimating marginal tax rates that incorporates the effects of stock option deductions.
We document a positive relation between leverage and post-option marginal tax rates.
Moreover, we find that firms that appear to use debt conservatively also use options extensively.
These results provide at least a partial explanation for the limited debt at highly profitable, option-intensive firms, such as Microsoft and Dell. By presenting evidence that options provide an important non-debt tax shield, this paper extends our understanding of the role of taxes in financial decisions.
Finally, the fact that employee stock option deductions shelter corporate taxable income does not necessarily imply a revenue loss for the U.S. Treasury. When employees exercise inthe-money nonqualified options, they generate ordinary taxable income equal to the company's tax deduction, which is the standard tax treatment for compensation. Moreover, the individual revenue increase likely exceeds the corporate revenue loss for at least two reasons. First, the deduction sometimes expires unused by the corporation for lack of taxable income. Second, the individual likely is taxed at a high ordinary income tax rate because the additional income often pushes the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket. If option exercisers for our sample are in the highest individual tax bracket (39.6 percent in 2000), we estimate a net revenue gain of $15 billion from our sample of firms for the U.S. Treasury. This gain is equivalent to increasing the corporate tax rate by 7 percent.
APPENDIX
Microsoft's Stock Option Plan Footnote for the year ended June 30, 2000
The Company has stock option plans for directors, officers, and employees, which provide for nonqualified and incentive stock options. Options granted prior to 1995 generally vest over four and one-half years and expire 10 years from the date of grant. Options granted during and after 1995 generally vest over four and one-half years and expire seven years from the date of grant, while certain options vest either over four and one-half years or over seven and one-half years and expire after 10 years. At June 30, 2000, options for 341 million shares were vested and 734 million shares were available for future grants under the plans.
Stock options outstanding were as follows: 
Total operating expenses 8,848 9,577 9,819 10,860 12,019 13,912 The weighted average Black-Scholes value of options granted under the stock option plans during 1998, 1999, and 2000 was $11.81, $20.90, and $36.67 . Value was estimated using a weighted average expected life of 5.3 years in 1998, 5.0 years in 1999, and 6.2 years in 2000, no dividends, volatility of 0.32 in 1998 and 1999 and 0.33 in 2000, and risk-free interest rates of 5.7 percent, 4.9 percent, and 6.2 percent in 1998, 1999, and 2000.
TABLE I
Descriptive statistics on option characteristics All variables are from the Black-Scholes option valuation assumptions in the company financial statement footnotes. Expected life is years from grant until average exercise. The risk-free interest rate is the rate on zero-coupon U.S. government issues with remaining term equal to the expected life of the options. Dividend yield is dividends as a percentage of share price. Annual return volatility is the standard deviation of the continuously compounded rates of return on the stock (i.e., standard deviation of the difference in the natural logarithm of stock prices). value is total debt divided by the market value of the firm, where market value equals book assets minus book equity plus market equity. Debt-toassets is total debt divided by total assets. Interest-to-value is debt interest divided by market value. Deductions-to-value is the dollar amount of option deductions in 2000 divided by market value. Kink in the proportion by which interest could be increased before the value of incremental interest deductions would begin to fall. Kink is calculated as in Graham (2000) using pre-option earnings. A high value for kink can be interpreted to mean that a firm has unused debt capacity (ignoring the effect of option deductions). These correlations are for the 156 firms included in the regression analysis. ***, **, * means statistically different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Significance for the tax variables tests whether the correlation coefficient equals zero versus the alternative that the coefficient is greater than zero. 
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TABLE VI More regressions of debt-to-value on marginal tax rates and control variables
The dependent variable is Debt-to-value (total debt divided by the market value of the firm, where market value equals book assets minus book equity plus market equity). MTR w/ future grants is the simulated marginal tax rate, with historic deductions, future deductions for already granted options, and deductions for not-yet-granted options deducted from EBT. MTR w/ future grants (Value Line) is the same simulated tax variable, based on stock price and growth projections from Value Line. S&P dummy is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one for S&P firms and 0 for Nasdaq firms. Stock Volatility is the volatility of stock returns. Option Deductions/Assets is the dollar value of tax deductions from employee stock options divided by total assets. Though not shown in the table, each regression includes PP&E/Assets, Quick ratio, Cash Flow, R&D, Sales, and five 2-digit SIC code dummies. Regression coefficients and P-values (in parentheses) are shown for the tax variable(s) and new control variables. The rightmost five columns summarize regressions that include, respectively, only firms that have nonzero debt, earnings greater than zero, an S&P bond rating, an investment grade bond rating, and growth larger than the mean growth in taxable income for the sample (3.6%). The four leftmost columns include all firms with nonmissing values for the explanatory variables. The regressions are all tobit specifications, except for the "Debt>0" column, which is OLS. . 05-.10 .10-.15 .15-.20 .20-.25 .25-.30 >.30 Marginal Tax Rates
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Histogram for MTRs for the firms in the Nasdaq 100 in 2000. Before Options are the simulated tax rates calculated using EBT but ignoring option deductions. After Options are the simulated tax rates calculated using EBT, including the effect of option deductions
